在交通和通信技术均不发达的古代中国，如何实现有效的国家治理？历代王朝又为何会出现由盛转衰的情况？从组织经济学的角度，构建一个内外冲突的双均衡分析框架，为解答上述问题提供了一种可能的解释。假设古代统治者的首要目标是维持政权稳定，然而其必须在内部威胁和外部威胁之间进行权衡取舍。经分析可以证明，当古代统治者主要面临内部威胁时，最优的制度安排是集权；反之，当古代统治者主要面临外部威胁时，最优的制度安排则是分权。在集权均衡状态下，古代统治者为了强化对政权的掌控倾向于加强对官员的监督，在选拔官员时更看重忠诚度，地方执行政策时奉行“一刀切”原则，并在行政区划方面遵循“犬牙交错”的原则划界。在分权均衡状态下，古代统治者倾向于强调对官员的激励，在选拔官员时更看重能力，允许地方政府实行多样化的政策，并在行政区划方面依据“山川形便”的原则划界。这一分析框架能够解释唐朝的藩镇割据、北宋的“强干弱枝”现象，也有助于回答“黄炎培之问”，为理解古代中国的国家治理与政权兴衰提供了新的视角。

国家治理, 稳定, 集权, 分权, 组织经济学

In ancient China, where transportation and communication technologies were underdeveloped, how was effective national governance achieved? Why did successive dynasties experience cycles of prosperity and decline? From the perspective of organizational economics, this study constructs a dual-equilibrium approach of internal and external conflicts to offer a possible explanation for these issues. Under acentralized equilibrium, rulers strengthened control by intensifying oversight of officials, prioritizing loyalty over competence when selecting officials, implementing uniform policies, and adopting administrative boundaries based on the “interlocking teeth” principle. In a decentralized equilibrium, rulers emphasized the incentive of officials, valued competence in the recruitment process, implemented flexible policies, and delineated boundaries following the “natural barriers” principle. This framework explains phenomena such as the “fanzhen” separatist military governors of the Tang Dynasty and the “strong trunk, weak branches” administrative strategy of the Northern Song Dynasty. It also helps to answer Huang Yanpei’s historical question on dynastic cycles, offering a new perspective for understanding state governance and the rise and fall of regimes in ancient China.

state governance, stability, centralization, decentralization, organizational economics