摘要：

改革开放之后，在中国独特的制度约束之下，地方政府的行为出现偏离与变异。对此，学界出现了两种解释路径。激励论认为在经济激励和政治激励之下，地方政府出现行为偏离。压力论认为在压力之下，地方政府采用政策变通应对上级任务。激励论和压力论都从科层体系内部的角度展开研究，没有关注科层体系之外的影响因素，忽略了国家角色及其对地方政府行为的影响。这就需要第三种解释路径，即国家政权建设论，以超越激励论和压力论，解释地方政府为何会发生“从行为偏离到坚定执行”的转变。该理论将国家带入分析框架，建构体系、结构与行为的逻辑框架，分析权力配置、激励方向与压力结构的变化如何影响地方政府行为，解释地方政府的行为转变背后的不变逻辑。

关键词:

地方政府, 政府行为, 激励, 压力, 国家政权建设

Abstract:

After the implementation of the Reform and Opening Up Policy in China, local government behavior has exhibited deviations and variations under the unique institutional constraints. Scholars have provided two main explanatory paths for this phenomenon. The Incentive Theory suggests that local government behavior deviates under the influence of economic and political incentives, while the Pressure Theory proposes that local governments adopt policy flexibility to cope with pressure from higher authorities. Both Incentive Theory and Pressure Theory focus on internal dynamics within the bureaucratic system, neglecting the impact of external factors, particularly the role of the state and its influence on local government behavior. Therefore, a third explanatory path is needed, namely the Country Rebuilding Theory, to transcend the Incentive Theory and the Pressure Theory, and explain the transition of local government behavior from “deviation” to “resolute execution”.

Key words:

local government,  government behavior,  incentives,  pressure,  state building