摘要：

关键词:

Abstract:

In recent years, the anti-monopoly in platform economy in China has shown an increasing trend, butit also faces many complex situations and practical challenges. At present, there are three major difficulties. Firstly, the evaluation of platform strength. The evaluation of platform market power should not skip the relevant market definition directly. To simplify the definition, we can take the platform service content facing consumers as the main division, and need to evaluate the market power of aggregation platform and single platform differently, and consider the control ability of the platform to the secondary market. Secondly, the regulation of algorithm collusion. It can be divided into messenger type, hub-spoke type, predictable type and self-learning type. The self-learning type will not violate antitrust law but may be converted into the three types of algorithms above. The key to law enforcement after the event is to reverse the information asymmetry of law enforcement agencies. The regulation should encourage the platform to actively interpret sensitive algorithms and standardize the data acquisition and application of the platform. Thirdly, it controls the disorderly merger and acquisition of the start-up enterprises by controlling the large platform. Based on the characteristics and harm of killer acquisitions, the system of merger control can be adjusted.

Key words:

"> platform economy｜antitrust law｜market power｜algorithm collusion｜killer acquisitions